EU Law Blog

Intel, Abuse of a Dominant Position and Massive Fine

You've probably read the news already: Intel has been fined €1.06 billion (US $ 1.43 billion) by the Commission for abusing its dominant position in breach of Article 82 EC. That is the largest fine ever imposed by the Commission on a single corporation.

Not much has been made public so far.

There's this press release and this memo giving a minimum of background.

It transpires that the Commission reproaches Intel, apart from being a very successful company for a poll indicating that the fine is unfair, see here), for doing two sorts of things:
- giving its customers illegal loyalty rebates, and
- by paying computer manufacturers and retailers to restrict the commercialisation of competitors' products, which means in practice AMD's products. (For AMD's take on the decision, see here).

It is a pity that the Commission does not think fit to give the reading public more information or even release a version of the decision. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the memo seems to indicate that because the fine represents only 4.15 % of Intel's turnover in 2008 - well below the cap of 10% of annual turnover set in Regulation 1/2003 - it could have been higher still.

Intel has denied breaking the law and announced its intention to seek judicial review.

Fixed Book Prices, Free Movement of Goods and Justification: Case C-531/07

Here's a standard, solid judgment on the free movement of goods and fixed book prices.

In its judgment in Case C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH the Court of Justice held that a prohibition on importers of German-language books from fixing a price below the retail price fixed or recommended by the publisher in the State of publication constitutes a restriction on the free movement of goods which cannot be justified.

Austrian legislation contained provisions on the obligation to sell German-language books at a fixed price. In particular, the legislation provided that the publisher or importer is to fix and publish a retail price and the importer is not to fix a price below the retail price fixed or recommended by the publisher for the State of publication, less any value added tax comprised in it. Moreover, the legislation granted the Austrian Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft (trade association of the chamber of commerce for the book and media trade) the power to publish the retail prices to which the booksellers are subject for the sale in Austria of German-language books.

That did not suit a big book retailer in Austria, LIBRO, which advertised books published in Germany for sale in Austria at prices below the minimum set for Austria on the basis of German prices.

The Fachverband sued LIBRO and sought an injunction from the competent Austrian court directing LIBRO to cease such advertising.

The Austrian court wondered whether the legislation was contrary to Article 28 EC and referred the matter to the Court of Justice.

The Court of Justice answered in the affirmative.

It recalled that all trading rules enacted by member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered to be measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions for the purposes of Article 28 EC (Case 8/74 Dassonville, paragraph 5).

The Court went on to examine whether the Austrian legislation concerned a "selling arrangement". It held that the application to products from other member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to constitute such a hindrance, on condition that those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other member States. Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products (see Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard, paragraphs 16 and 17, and Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy, paragraph 36, see here for our post on that important judgment).

But, the Court held, the Austrian legislation, by prohibiting Austrian importers of German-language books from fixing a retail price below that fixed or recommended by the publisher for the State of publication, less any VAT comprised in it, provides for a less favourable treatment for imported books since it prevents Austrian importers and foreign publishers from fixing minimum retail prices according to the conditions of the import market, whereas the Austrian publishers are free to fix themselves, for their goods, such minimum retail prices for the national market. Consequently, such provisions constitute a measure having equivalent effect to an import restriction contrary to Article 28 EC, because they create, for imported books, a distinct regulation which has the effect of treating products from other member States less favorably.

The Court also held that the Austrian legislation could not be justified under Article 30 EC. Although the protection of books as cultural objects can be considered an overriding requirement in the public interest, the particular measure was disproportionate as the importer or foreign publisher could not fix a retail price for the Austrian market taking into account the conditions of that particular market.

Commission Report on Monitoring of Compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights

The Commission has recently published an informative report entitled "Report on the practical operation of the methodology for a systematic and rigorous monitoring of compliance with the Charter of fundamental rights" (COM (2009) 0205).

The report is really quite a gold mine of information and references. It rewards reading.

For example, the report shows how issues of fundamental rights crop up in very different areas of EU law, such as chemical regulations, agricultural law or customs law. But, the report warns, it is important for other institutions to be mindful of the need to comply with fundamental rights. It describes two options available to the Commission should the Council and European Parliament fail to respect fundamental rights in the exercise of their legislative powers:

As a last resort, as it already indicated in the 2005 Communication, the Commission is ready to contemplate an annulment action: strategically, the best utilisation of the annulment action would be where the legislator has made specific amendments to the Commission's proposal, which the Commission considers clearly violate fundamental rights. In the case of such specific amendments, where they can be separated from the rest of the instrument, an annulment action is the better course. The offending provisions can be singled out, while preserving from attack the other provisions of the legislative act which might represent valuable progress that the Commission would not wish to sacrifice.
Where, on the other hand, the legislator has departed significantly from the Commission proposal in terms of fundamental rights protection so that the centre of gravity of the proposal as far as that protection is concerned has shifted, the withdrawal of the proposal could be the preferred option. The long standing position of the Commission has been that its right of initiative also implies the right to withdraw its proposal and, this, in cases where amendments made by the legislator to the Commission's proposal lead either to a manifest illegality or to a serious distortion of the Commission proposal.

The Commission's report refers extensively to the influential report of Johannes Voggenhuber MEP of 2007 on compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Commission's legislative proposals: methodology for systematic and rigorous monitoring (PE 378.675v02-00).

For previous posts on fundamental rights see here and here.

Preliminary References, Admissibility and the Transposition Period: Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07

Now here's an interesting judgment on preliminary references that takes a liberal approach to their admissibility. It also makes clear that national courts must refrain from taking any decision likely to compromise the objective of a directive during the transposition period.

The Court of Justice held in its judgment in Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV that a preliminary reference on the interpretation of a directive is admissible when the question is posed before the expiry of the time for transposition of the directive in question.

The substance of the case need not detain us. It concerns a rather recondite point on the meaning of Directive 2005/29/EC, the unfair commercial practices directive.

The point concerning the admissibility of the preliminary reference was the following: The national court decided to refer the question of interpretation of the directive on May 24th 2007 while the deadline for transposition of the directive was December 12th 2007. One of the parties to the main proceedings submitted that the preliminary reference was inadmissible as a consequence.

The Court of Justice disagreed. It held that the preliminary reference was indeed admissible.

The Court recalled its traditional case-law according to which it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court of Justice. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court of Justice is bound, in principle, to give a ruling (Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra, paragraph 38; Case C‑18/01 Korhonen and Others, paragraph 19; and Case C‑295/05 Asemfo, paragraph 30).

Preliminary references are presumed to be relevant. That presumption may be rebutted only in exceptional cases such as where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of EU law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose (Case C‑415/93 Bosman, paragraph 61, and Case C‑212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française et gouvernement wallon, paragraph 29).

The Court of Justice examined whether, in this case, the question referred was patently irrelevant. It held it was clear that it was not.

The Court recalled that not only the national provisions specifically intended to transpose a directive but also, from the date of that directive’s entry into force, the pre-existing national provisions capable of ensuring that the national law is consistent with it must be considered to fall within the scope of that directive (Case C‑81/05 Cordero Alonso, paragraph 29).

Both at the time of the main proceedings and at the time when the decision to refer was adopted, the pre-existing provisions of national law were regarded by the national authorities as being capable of ensuring transposition of the Directive from the date of its entry into force, that is to say, from June 12th 2005, and, accordingly, as falling within its scope.

Then the Court of Justice neatly extended to national courts the obligation to refrain from taking decisions contrary to the directive during the time laid down for transposition.

The Court recalled its case-law that during the period prescribed for transposition of a directive, the member States to which it is addressed must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive (Case C‑129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie, paragraph 45; Case C‑14/02 ATRAL, paragraph 58; and Case C‑144/04 Mangold, paragraph 67).

It then continued to the effect that all the authorities of the member States concerned, including the national courts, have such an obligation to refrain from taking measures. It follows that, from the date upon which a directive has entered into force, the courts of the Member States must refrain as far as possible from interpreting domestic law in a manner which might seriously compromise, after the period for transposition has expired, attainment of the objective pursued by that directive (Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others, paragraphs 122 and 123).

For a previous post on when the Court of Justice will decline to answer a preliminary reference, see here.

Standing to sue, Individuals, Habitats and a Commission Decision: Case C-362/06 P

The Court of Justice has once again taken a fairly strict line on the matter of the standing to sue of individuals.

In Case C-362/06 P Markku Sahlstedt and Others v. Commission the Court of Justice dismissed an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance declaring inadmissible an action for annulment brought by landowners against a Commission decision classifying certain areas of land as being of ecological significance.

Under the "Habitats Directive", Council Directive 92/43/EC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, each member State must propose a list of important ecological sites to the Commission. Then the Commission must publish a list of those important sites together with certain environmental information on each site listed. Finally, the member States must designate the sites in their territory as "special areas of conservation" ("SACs") and take special measures to protect the environment in those areas.

The Commission published the list of sites in the Boreal biogeographical region, mainly up in Finland. But certain landowners with land in those sites and an association of farmers and foresters brought an action before the Court of First Instance to annul that Commission Decision.

The Court of First Instance declared that the action was inadmissible in its order in Case T-150/05 Sahlstedt and Others v. Commission. It held that that the applicants were not directly concerned by the contested decision, within the meaning of Article 230 § 4 EC: The Commission decision challenged, while it binds the member State as to the result to be achieved, leaves the choice of the conservation measures to be undertaken and the authorisation procedures to be followed to the competent national authorities. Consequently, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case without examining the merits.

The Applicants then appealed to the Court of Justice.

In a interesting twist, Advocate General Bot, in his opinion of October 23rd 2008, concluded that the appeal was well-founded, that the landowners were individually concerned by the Commission decision and that the case should be sent back to the Court of First Instance so that it could rule on the merits.

The Court of Justice did not follow the Advocate General's opinion and held that the applicants were not individually concerned.

The Court recalled that persons other than addressees of a decision may claim to be individually concerned only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of those factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed by such a decision (see, inter alia, Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission at 107, and Case C‑78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, paragraph 33). It found in the present case that the contested decision is a measure of general application because it applies to all economic operators who, in whatever capacity, carry on or are likely to carry on activities in the areas concerned which could jeopardize the conservation objectives of the Habitats Directive.

The Court continued to the effect that a provision of general application inasmuch as it applies to the economic operators concerned in general can still be of individual concern to some (see, Case C‑309/89 Codorniu, paragraph 19, and Joined Cases C‑182/03 and C‑217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, paragraph 58). Where the decision affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons may be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of economic operators (Case C‑125/06 P Commission v Infront WM, paragraph 71 - for our post on that case, see here). However, the fact that it is possible to determine more or less precisely the number, or even the identity, of the persons to whom a measure applies by no means implies that that measure must be regarded as being of individual concern to those persons where it is established that that application takes effect by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question (Case C‑451/98 Antillean Rice Mills v Council, paragraph 52; the order in Case C‑96/01 P Galileo and Galileo International v Council, paragraph 38; and the order in Case C‑503/07 P Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission, paragraph 70).

The Court of Justice held that the contested decision is of concern to the appellants only in so far as they have rights in the lands covered by some of the sites of Community interest adopted by the Commission with a view to enabling the establishment of a coherent European ecological network of SACs. Thus, the decision affects them by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question and not in accordance with criteria specific to the category of landowners. Nor was the contested decision adopted in the light of the specific situation of the landowners: The Decision cannot be regarded as a group of individual decisions addressed to each landowner.

Consequently, the appellants are not individually concerned by the contested decision for the purposes of Article 230 § 4 EC.

What is interesting in this case is how the Court of Justice has substituted its reasoning for that of the Court of First Instance. The latter held that the applicants were not "directly" concerned by the contested Decision, whereas the Court of Justice dealt only with the issue as to whether they were "individually" concerned by it.

For a previous post on standing, see here.

Commission Report on How Regulation 1/2003 Works

Regulation 1/2003 is the main regulation laying down the procedure in antitrust cases. It entered into force on on May 1 2004. It brought about a major reform of the procedure by decentralizing the application of the EU antitrust rules and co-opted national competition authorities and national courts to apply those provisions.

The Commission had to report publicly within 5 years on how the new system worked.

You can read the report in full (COM(2009) 206 final) here and the Staff Working Paper (SEC(2009) 574 final) that contains more detail here.

Notwithstanding the stilted, self congratulatory tone, those documents are worth reading and contain a wealth of information that will delight antitrust mavens. It does seem that the system has worked pretty well and that national competition authorities have applied Articles 81 and 82 EC satisfactorily (sometimes more effectively than the Commission itself). Certainly, the rights of the companies investigated are more effectively protected on the domestic level than the EU one.

The report is inconclusive as to what changes should be made to Regulation 1/2003 to make the system better still.

Blogging break

Just to let all you patient readers know that we're taking a break for about ten days.

It is vacation time !

Enjoy the break, too.

Uncastrated Pigs, State Liability and Limitation Periods: Case C-445/06

The principle of State liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible is now very well established (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others, paragraph 35; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 31; Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas, paragraph 24; and Joined Cases C-178/94, C‑179/94 and C-188/94 to C‑190/94 Dillenkofer and Others, paragraph 20).

But what is the relationship between a national action in damages and an infringement procedure brought by the Commission pursuant to Article 226 ? Does an infringement action interrupt a national limitation period ? When does the national limitation period start to run if a member State has failed to implement a directive properly ? Must the person alleging loss and damage mitigate the loss suffered ? Those are some of the questions dealt with by the Court of Justice's judgment in Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

The facts are.... agricultural. Danske Slagterier is an association of Danish slaughterhouse companies and pig farmers. It claims compensation from the German Federal state for loss due to an infringement of EU law. It alleges that, in breach of EU law, Germany imposed an import ban on meat from uncastrated male pigs from 1993 to 1999. That ban led to a considerable financial loss.

What happened was that at the beginning of the 1990s, a project called the ‘Male-Pig-Projekt’, whose objective was the farming of uncastrated male pigs, was launched in Denmark. That type of farming, which is profitable, entails the risk of the meat, when heated, giving off a pronounced sexual odour. The German authorities considered that the smell was attributable to the hormone androstenone, the formation of which can be avoided by castration at an early stage.

In January 1993, Germany informed the other member States that the rule laid down in Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 64/433 had been transposed into national law in such a way that a threshold of 0.5 µg/g was fixed for androstenone; if that threshold were exceeded, the meat would give off a pronounced boar taint and would thus be unfit for human consumption. Germany also stated then that only Professor Claus’s modified enzyme immunoassay was recognised as a specific method for identifying androstenone and that meat from uncastrated male pigs exceeding that threshold could not be transported as fresh meat into Germany.

As a consequence, many consignments of pigmeat from Denmark were subsequently checked by the German authorities and rejected because they exceeded the threshold for androstenone. Also, the pig farmers and slaughterhouse companies which had almost ceased production of castrated male pigs had to resume such production in order not to put exports to Germany at risk. Danske Slagterier claims that if the pigmeat exported had come from uncastrated pigs as envisaged by the Male-Pig-Projekt, considerable costs savings could have been achieved.

Danske Slagterier brought an action for damages against the German Federal state before the competent court in Bonn. At first instance it was held that the action was well founded in respect of the period commencing on 7 December 1996 and dismissed the action as time-barred in respect of losses which had arisen before that date. On appeal, the entire claim was uheld on the merits. The Federal State then appealed to the Supreme court, the Bundesgerichtshof.

Meanwhile, the Commission had commenced article 226 proceedings against Germany. The Court of Justice held in those proceedings by its judgment of November 12th 1998 in Case C-102/96 Commission v. Germany that Germany had breached Directive 64/433 and Directive 89/662 by imposing the obligation of marking the carcasses of uncastrated male pigs and subjecting them to heat treatment whenever the meat, regardless of carcasse weight, had an androstenone content of more than 0.5 μg/g, as shown by Professor Claus's modified enzyme immunoassay, and by regarding the meat as giving off a pronounced sexual odour and consequently unfit for human consumption if the threshold of 0.5 μg/g of androstenone was exceeded.

The German Federal Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice a series of questions on the relationship between the Article 226 judgment and the pending action in damages.

The national court asked whether, where the Commission has brought infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC, EU law requires the limitation period laid down by national legislation for a claim seeking reparation on account of State liability for breach of EU law to be interrupted or suspended during those proceedings, if there is no effective legal remedy in the State in question to compel it to transpose a directive.

The Court of Justice held that that, where the Commission has brought infringement proceedings, EU law does not require any such interruption or suspension during those proceedings.In that regard, the Court recalls that the purpose of infringement proceedings is not to safeguard individual rights and individuals have no right to require the Commission to adopt a specific position (Case 247/87 Star Fruit v. Commission).

The national court also asked whether the limitation period applicable to an action for damages against the State for incorrect transposition of a directive begins to run, irrespective of the applicable national law, only when the directive has been fully transposed, or whether that period begins to run, in accordance with national law, on the date on which the first injurious effects of the incorrect transposition have been produced and further injurious effects thereof are foreseeable.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude the limitation period applicable to an action for damages against the State for incorrect transposition of a directive from beginning to run on the date on which the first injurious effects of the incorrect transposition have been produced and the further injurious effects are foreseeable, even if that date is prior to the correct transposition of the directive. The Court confronted the problem judgment of Case C-208/90 Emmott in which it had held in paragraph 23 that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting member State may not rely on an individual’s delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time. But, recalled the Court, was confirmed in Case C-410/92 Johnson, paragraph 26, it was clear from Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings that the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of that case, in which a time-bar had the result of depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatsoever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a directive (see also Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum, paragraph 52; Joined Cases C-114/95 and C‑115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C-279/96 to C-281/96 Ansaldo Energia and Others, paragraph 20).

The Court held that it was clear in this case that the existence of the time-limit at issue did not have the result, as in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment in Emmott, of depriving the injured parties of any opportunity whatsoever to rely on their rights before the national courts.

Finally, the German court asked whether EU law precludes a rule such as that laid down in Paragraph 839(3) of the BGB which provides that an individual cannot obtain reparation for loss or damage which he has wilfully or negligently failed to avert by utilising a legal remedy.

The Court answered that EU law does not preclude the application of a national rule requiring mitigation of damage. It recalled that it is a general principle common to the legal systems of the Member States that the injured party must show reasonable diligence in limiting the extent of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the loss or damage himself (Joined Cases C‑104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and Others v. Council and Commission>, paragraph 33, and Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 85).

Right of Residence, Free Movement of Persons, Non-EU Spouses: Case C-127/08

How could this have happened ? We're kind of embarrassed..... Here's a major case dealing with the free movement of persons in which the Court of Justice overruled itself and handed down a judgment that's very "citizen friendly". And we did not blog about it !

The case is C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the judgment was handed down on July 25th 2008.

Here's the story (of the case, not how we managed to overlook it). The case came to the Court of Justice on a reference from the Irish High Court. There were four cases before the Irish court concerning a non-EU member State national who arrived in Ireland and applied for asylum. In each case the application was refused. While resident in Ireland the four asylum seekers married citizens of the Union who did not have Irish nationality but who were resident in Ireland. None of the marriages was a marriage of convenience. After the marriage, each of the non-EU spouses (the asylum seekers) applied for a residence permit as the spouse of a EU citizen. The applications were refused by the Minister for Justice on the ground that the spouse did not satisfy the condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State.

The reason why the residence permits were refused is the following. Directive 2004/38 - which we have commented on before here and here - provides that all citizens have the right to move and reside in the territory of another member State as workers or students or if they have comprehensive sickness insurance and sufficient funds not to become a burden on the social assistance system. The family members of a citizen of the EU have the right to move and reside in the Member States with that citizen. They can enter a member State if they have an entry visa or residence card issued by a member State.

The Irish legislation implementing Directive 2004/38 in Ireland provides that a citizen of an EU country who is a family member of an EU citizen may reside with or join that citizen in Ireland only if he is already lawfully resident in another member State. And that was not the case for the applicants in Case C-127/08.

Consequently, the Irish High Court asked the Court of Justice whether the condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State is compatible with the terms of Directive 2004/38.

The Court of Justice held - to the surprise of many - that the condition of prior lawful residence was not compatible with Directive 2004/38. It held that the application of the directive is not conditional on family members having previously resided in a member State. The directive applies to all EU citizens who move to or reside in a member State other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members who accompany them or join them in that Member State. The definition of family members in the directive does not distinguish according to whether or not they have already resided lawfully in another member State.

The Court examines its previous case law and expressly overrules its judgment in Case C-109/01 Akrich (which it had previously tried to confine to its facts in Case C-1/05 Yungying Jia). In Case C-109/01 Akrich the Court had upheld the condition of prior lawful residence in another EU state.

It is really quite rare for the Court of Justice to overrule itself.

The European Court's Political Power: Article by Karen Alter

Professor Karen Alter of Northwestern University has published an article entitled "The European Court's Political Power Across Time and Space".

Here's what the abstract states:

"This article extracts from Alter's larger body of work insights on how the political and social context shapes the ECJ's political power and influence. Part I considers how the political context facilitated the constitutionalization of the European legal system. Part II considers how the political context helps determine where and when the current ECJ influences European politics. Part III draws lessons from the ECJ's experience, speculating on how the European context in specific allowed the ECJ to become such an exceptional international court. Part IV lays out a research agenda to investigate the larger question of how social support shapes the role of judges in politics.

You can download the article here.

It is definitely worth reading. In fact, that article is part of a much larger project: Professor Alter has a book coming out on the subject as the introduction to the article makes clear:

"This article is adapted from the introduction and conclusion of my new book The European Court’s Political Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), which brings together 15 years of my articles and book chapters regarding the European Court of Justice’s political role in European politics. The introduction and conclusion pull out a common narrative from extensively researched chapters that focus on different pieces and parts of the ECJ’s history. The common story told across analyses is that the ECJ gains influence by allying with societal actors within states to encourage greater respect for European rules. The larger volume shows that societal actors do not always choose to draw the ECJ into their campaigns. Also, the ECJ’s agency matters—the ECJ at times chooses to play a minimalist role, interpreting law narrowly and even illogically when there is little social support for the law it is asked to apply. The analysis suggests that factors exogenous to the ECJ, activation by others and the presence of societal actors who share the ECJ’s substantive objectives, are the largest factors shaping the role the ECJ plays. The larger book embeds this narrative across issues and cases so that we can see what makes societal actors want to work with the ECJ, and vice versa.